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AMENDMENT: NAVIGATING A TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION THREAT TO WITHHOLD
FUNDING FROM MARIJUANA-FRIENDLY
STATES
Arlen Gharibian*
The Trump administration has taken a firm stance
against marijuana legalization at the state level. While an
official federal policy is still pending, this Article focuses on
whether the Trump administration’s threats to prevent
California from pursuing its duly enacted marijuana
legalization law violates the Tenth Amendment. This Article
then addresses how the federal government could achieve its
goal while remaining within the bounds of the Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to common knowledge, marijuana’s prevalence in
America dates back to the colonial era.1 In fact, the plant was so
inherent to society that the Founding Fathers wrote the first two drafts
of the Declaration of Independence on hemp paper.2 Yet, as states
today increasingly accept marijuana within their borders, the federal
government grows increasingly irritated.3
On November 8, 2016, California voters approved Proposition
64, the Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA), legalizing recreational
marijuana use in the state.4 Nevertheless, marijuana legalization at the
state level has received backlash from President Trump’s Justice
Department, indicating that states should expect to see greater
enforcement of federal marijuana laws.5 Among this backlash is the
federal government’s potential threat to withhold funds from
California if the state continues to support the AUMA.6
This conflict between California and the federal government
raises Tenth Amendment concerns. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution explicitly states that “[t]he powers not

1. Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., State Medical Marijuana Laws: Understanding the Laws
and Their Limitations, 23 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 413, 415 (2003).
2. JOHN W. ROULAC, HEMP HORIZONS: THE COMEBACK OF THE WORLD’S MOST
PROMISING PLANT 32 (1997).
3. See generally German Lopez, The Trump Administration’s New War on Marijuana,
Explained,
VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/4/16849866/marijuanalegalization-trump-sessions-cole-memo (last updated Jan. 5, 2018, 10:35 AM) (“Some legalization
advocates worried that Sessions, a vocal critic of legalization, would simply take a tougher
interpretation of the [Cole] memo — by, say, telling prosecutors to crack down on states that let
any marijuana land in the hands of minors or across state lines (both of which are, to some extent,
unavoidable no matter how strict a state is). But Sessions has gone even further, ending the Cole
memo and related guidances altogether. Since marijuana is illegal at the federal level, the change
will let federal prosecutors go after state-legal marijuana at their own discretion — a return to the
pre-memo days.”).
4. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_64,_Marijuana_Legalization_(2016) (last visited
Oct. 16, 2018); Patrick McGreevy, Californians Vote to Legalize Recreational Use of Marijuana
in
the
State,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2016,
8:12
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/trailguide/la-na-election-day-2016-proposition-64marijuana-1478281845-htmlstory.html.
5. See Lopez, supra note 3.
6. Jacob Margolis, What Happens if Jeff Sessions Tries Dismantling California’s Pot
Industry?, 89.3 KPCC: TAKE TWO (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.scpr.org/programs/taketwo/2017/03/02/55394/what-happens-if-jeff-sessions-tries-dismantling-ca/.
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delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”7
This Article explores two issues: (1) whether the Trump
administration’s threats to prevent California from pursuing its duly
enacted marijuana legalization law violates the Tenth Amendment;
and (2) if so, how the Trump administration can pursue its attempt to
prevent California from following through with marijuana legalization
without violating the Tenth Amendment.
II. HISTORICAL TRENDS IN MARIJUANA
Before delving into the tension between Proposition 64 and the
Trump administration’s enforcement priorities, it will be useful to first
understand how marijuana has been classified over time, including the
various positions the federal government and individual states have
taken in making decisions regarding marijuana legalization.
Marijuana has been a part of American history since Jamestown
settlers first introduced it in 1611, when they arrived in Virginia with
the plant for use in hemp production.8 From the time marijuana arrived
in the United States, the plant’s cultivation flourished.9 Physicians and
pharmacists widely dispensed marijuana for a variety of illnesses, and
even included marijuana in standard pharmaceutical reference
works.10 Even the most notable American presidents, including
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, advocated hemp
cultivation and grew marijuana themselves.11
Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, states began to
oppose marijuana.12 In 1913, California, always a trailblazer, became
the first state to outlaw marijuana.13 Other states soon followed, and
by 1931, twenty-nine states had passed laws prohibiting the use of

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Pacula et al., supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL,
RECREATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC 16, 18 (2012); Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and
Gardner, 61 ARNOLDIA, no. 4, 2002, at 9, 10.
12. BRUCE BARCOTT, WEED THE PEOPLE: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA IN AMERICA
20 (2015).
13. Id.
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marijuana for nonmedicinal purposes.14 This sudden backlash against
marijuana was rooted not in the plant itself, but rather in the racial
identities of its users.15 State after state prohibited marijuana, “usually
when faced with significant numbers of Mexicans or Negroes utilizing
the drug.”16 Soon, nearly every western state had passed antimarijuana legislation.17
The federal government was not far behind and first attempted to
curb marijuana use in 1937 by passing the Marihuana Tax Act.18
While the Marihuana Tax Act did not prohibit marijuana, Congress
essentially endeavored to outlaw marijuana with an extremely
prohibitive taxing scheme.19 Indeed, the overwhelmingly antimarijuana environment that gave way to the Marihuana Tax Act
continued to have an impact, leading to more legislation criminalizing
marijuana offenses throughout the 1950s.20 However, physicians
could continue to legally prescribe marijuana during this time.21 Still,
marijuana prohibition reached its peak in 1970 when Congress passed
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, now
known as the Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA).22
The CSA replaced the Marihuana Tax Act and created five
categories, known as “schedules,” for all controlled substances,
classifying the substances “based on their relative potential for abuse
as well as recognized medical usefulness.”23 Congress characterized
marijuana as a Schedule I drug, indicating that the plant “had no
currently accepted medical use in the United States and making it
illegal for doctors to medically prescribe.”24 Indeed, marijuana’s
14. Adam Rathge, Pondering Pot: Marijuana’s History and the Future of the War on Drugs,
ORG. AM. HISTORIANS: AM. HISTORIAN, http://tah.oah.org/issue-5/pondering-pot/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018).
15. BARCOTT, supra note 12.
16. LARRY SLOMAN, REEFER MADNESS: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA 30–31 (1998). The first
cities to perceive marijuana use as a problem were Texas border towns like El Paso and New
Orleans. Id. African Americans began using marijuana in New Orleans around 1910, and early
fears were that the vice would spread to white schoolchildren. Id.
17. John Caldbick, Marijuana Legalization in Washington, HISTORYLINK (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.historylink.org/File/10268.
18. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
19. BARCOTT, supra note 12, at 24.
20. Pacula et al., supra note 1, at 416.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Schedule I label is strict and comprehensive, classifying “any product
that contains any amount of tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) to be a
Schedule I controlled substance, even if such product is made from
portions of the cannabis plant that are excluded from the CSA
definition of ‘marihuana.’”25 Congress had successfully outlawed
marijuana at the federal level, making illegal the plant which had
flourished in the United States even before the country’s founding.
Twenty-six years passed before California pushed back, once
again asserting itself as a pioneer for change. In 1996, California
voters passed Proposition 215, dubbed the “Compassionate Use
Act.”26 Through the Compassionate Use Act, California offered legal
protection to medical marijuana users by removing state-level criminal
penalties for the use and possession of marijuana by patients with a
doctor’s recommendation.27 Proposition 215 aimed “[t]o ensure that
seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana
for medical purposes” when a physician determines “that the person’s
health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of . . .
[any illness] for which marijuana provides relief.”28 In the twenty-two
years since California’s stand against the CSA, thirty-two other states,
as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico, have
instituted comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis
programs.29
The federal government did not respond positively to California’s
legalization of medical marijuana. Until just a few years ago, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) was conducting raids on legal medical
marijuana dispensaries in California.30 In these raids, the DEA shut
down multiple dispensaries and seized their marijuana.31
25. Interpretation of Listing of “Tetrahydrocannabinols” in Schedule I, 66 Fed. Reg.
51530 (Oct. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308).
26. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
(last
visited
Nov. 18, 2018).
30. See Matt Ferner, DEA Raids 2 Los Angeles Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, HUFFPOST
(Oct. 24, 2014,
1:29
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/24/dea-raid-medicalmarijuana-los-angeles_n_6038926.html; Daniel White, DEA Must Stop Interfering with Legal
Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, Federal Court Rules, TIME (Oct. 20, 2015),
http://time.com/4080110/dea-medical-marijuana-california-ruling/.
31. Ferner, supra note 30; White, supra note 30.
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In 2014, however, Congress added the Rohrabacher-Farr
amendment to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2015, an appropriations bill that funds the
Departments of Commerce and Justice, as well as various other
agencies.32 The amendment bars the Justice Department from using
federal funding to prevent states with medical marijuana laws “from
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”33 In late-2015, Judge
Charles Breyer of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California ruled that the DEA could no longer interfere with
medical marijuana providers operating legally under state laws.34
In May 2016, just three months after his confirmation, United
States Attorney General Jeff Sessions began advocating his strong
anti-marijuana sentiments to members of Congress.35 Attorney
General Sessions heads the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
encompasses federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DEA.36 In a letter addressed to
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader
Chuck Schumer, House Speaker Paul Ryan, and House Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi, Attorney General Sessions opposed the
Rohrabacher-Farr amendment to the appropriations bill for the DOJ.37
Specifically, Attorney General Sessions expressed his concern with
regard to Congress restricting the discretion of the DOJ to fund
particular prosecutions, “particularly in the midst of an [sic] historic

32. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113–235,
128 Stat 2130 (2014); Christopher Ingraham, Federal Court Tells the DEA to Stop Harassing
Medical
Marijuana
Providers, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/20/federal-court-tells-the-dea-to-stopharassing-medical-marijuana-providers/?utm_term=.2cbe1873dc1d.
33. Ingraham, supra note 32.
34. United States v. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
35. Christopher Ingraham, Jeff Sessions Personally Asked Congress to Let Him Prosecute
Medical-Marijuana
Providers,
WASH.
POST
(June 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/13/jeff-sessions-personally-askedcongress-to-let-him-prosecute-medical-marijuana-providers/?utm_term=.91d2fc1ecd5e.
36. Randy Robinson, Jeff Sessions Hates Weed but Cannabis Lawyers Are Ready to Fight
Back, MERRY JANE (Nov. 1, 2017, 3:35 PM), https://merryjane.com/news/jeff-sessions-hatesweed-but-cannabis-lawyers-ready-to-fight-back.
37. Letter from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S., to Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority
Leader, Chuck Schumer, Senate Minority Leader, Paul Ryan, House Speaker, and Nancy Pelosi,
House Minority Leader (May 1, 2017) (on file with Congress); Ingraham, supra note 35.
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drug epidemic and potentially long-term uptick in violent crime.”38 He
advised, “The Department must be in a position to use all laws
available to combat the transnational drug organizations and
dangerous drug traffickers who threaten American lives.”39
Yet, despite resistance from both Attorney General Sessions and
the DEA, the legalization of medical marijuana throughout more than
half of the nation seemed to initiate complete recreational marijuana
legalization at the state level. Since 2012, ten states and the District of
Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use.40 In 2012,
Colorado and Washington became the first two states to legalize
recreational marijuana.41 Between 2014 and 2015, Alaska, Oregon,
and the District of Columbia followed suit.42 Finally, in 2016,
California, Nevada, Maine, and Massachusetts joined the budding
trend of recreational marijuana legalization.43
After a proposal to legalize marijuana in California failed in 2014
due to its backers’ inability to collect sufficient signatures,
Californians were adamant to succeed the second time around.44 In
2016, tech billionaire and former Facebook president Sean Parker
spearheaded another attempt to prevail in legalizing marijuana in
California.45 With the support of extensive funding, including over $1
million in funding from Parker alone, “[b]allot-measure backers
collected more than 600,000 signatures to put the initiative before
voters.”46 As a result, Proposition 64 was introduced on California’s
November 8, 2016 ballot as an initiated state statute.47

38. Letter from Jeff Sessions, supra note 37.
39. Id.
40. State Marijuana Laws in 2018 Map, GOVERNING THE STATES & LOCALITIES,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html
(last
updated Nov. 7, 2018).
41. Melia Robinson, It’s 2017: Here’s Where You Can Legally Smoke Weed Now, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/where-can-you-legally-smokeweed-2017-1.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Trevor Hughes, California Likely to Vote on Marijuana Legalization in November, USA
TODAY (May 4, 2016, 4:37 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/2016/05/04/california-likely-votemarijuana-legalization-november/83926306/.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), supra note 4.
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California voters passed Proposition 64 on November 8, 2016.48
Now, Californians who are twenty-one and older can possess,
transport, buy and use up to an ounce of marijuana for recreational
purposes.49 Moreover, the proposition permits individuals to grow as
many as six plants, and allows for retail sales of marijuana with a 15%
tax imposed.50 “Local governments may reasonably regulate
cultivation, up to and including requiring cultivation indoors or in a
greenhouse.”51 Yet, while Proposition 64 seems straightforward
enough, it arrived at a time which may cause unanticipated conflicts.
The same day that Golden State voters elected to legalize the
recreational use of marijuana, Americans elected Donald Trump to
become the forty-fifth President of the United States.52 While
President Trump himself has previously suggested that he will leave
marijuana legalization up to the individual states, his current
administration has not taken this same laissez faire approach.53 At the
forefront of this federal stance against state-level legalization is the
attorney general, Jeff Sessions.54
Attorney General Sessions has not been shy about his thoughts on
marijuana.55 He has stated that “good people don’t smoke marijuana,”
and that the effects of marijuana are “only slightly less awful” than
those of heroin.56 Indeed, Attorney General Sessions has gone so far
as to say he thought the Ku Klux Klan was “okay until [he] learned
they smoked pot.”57 Nevertheless, the federal government has not yet
48. Id.; McGreevy, supra note 4.
49. California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), supra note 4.
50. Id.
51. JEREMY DAW, NEW RULES: CALIFORNIA’S MARIJUANA LAW EXPLAINED 55 (2017).
52. Donald J. Trump, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/donald-j-trump/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2018); Elijah Wolfson & David Yanofsky, One in Every Five Americans Is
About to Get Legally High AF After this Election, QUARTZ (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://qz.com/832370/marijuana-legalization-succeeded-in-the-2016-elections-despite-theresults-of-the-presidential-race/.
53. Patrick McGreevy, Weed’s Legal in California, but Activists Fear a Battle Ahead with Jeff
Sessions, Trump’s Pick for Attorney General, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016, 12:05 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-marijuana-legalization-jeff-sessions-snap-20161201story.html.
54. Id.
55. Rick Anderson, Sessions Says He Has ‘Serious Concerns’ About Legal Marijuana. Now
States
Wonder
What’s
Next,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2017,
7:50
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-sessions-marijuana-20170809-story.html.
56. Id.
57. Paul Waldman, Why Jeff Sessions’s Marijuana Crackdown is Going to Make Legalization
More Likely, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
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instituted an official policy change toward marijuana.58 Attorney
General Sessions has, however, threatened and attempted to withhold
funding to achieve his goal of ensuring that local law enforcement
officials comply with federal immigration law in “sanctuary cities.”59
It is believed that Attorney General Sessions may use this same
coercive tactic to curb marijuana’s legalization at the state level.60
On January 4, 2018, Attorney General Sessions released a
memorandum which immediately rescinded the Cole Memo, strongly
suggesting a new trend in enforcement of marijuana’s federal
prohibition.61 The Cole Memo, written by then Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole, laid out the Obama-era policy on the federal
government’s approach to state-legal marijuana operations.62 The
Cole Memo effectively deprioritized the use of federal funds to
enforce marijuana prohibition under the CSA, instead recommending
“a more laissez-faire, hands-off approach.”63 Indeed, the Cole Memo
noted, “the federal government has traditionally relied on state and
local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana activity through
enforcement of their own narcotics laws.”64
The DOJ released Attorney General Sessions’s memo, which was
addressed to all United States attorneys.65 The memo reads, “previous
nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement is unnecessary
line/wp/2018/01/05/why-jeff-sessions-marijuana-crackdown-is-going-to-make-legalization-morelikely/?utm_term=.c96dab120278 (“He says that was a joke, but even so, it still says something
about where he’s coming from.”).
58. Alicia Wallace, Federal Marijuana Law Enforcement: What You Need to Know,
CANNABIST (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:20 AM), http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/03/07/federal-marijuanaenforcement-trump-administration-experts-questions/74933/.
59. Jessica Taylor, Attorney General Orders Crackdown on ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ Threatens
Holding Funds, NPR (Mar. 27, 2017, 3:42 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/27/521680263/attorney-general-orders-crackdown-on-sanctuarycities-threatens-holding-funds (“Sanctuary cities” are “generally defined as places where local law
enforcement limit their cooperation with federal authorities on immigration enforcement.”).
60. Margolis, supra note 6.
61. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III to All U.S. Attorneys, (Jan.
4, 2018) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice); Reid Wilson, Sessions Will End Policy that Allowed
Legalized
Marijuana
to
Prosper,
HILL
(Jan.
4,
2018,
8:53
AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/367384-sessions-will-end-policy-that-allowedmarijuana-to-prosper-report.
62. Lisa Rough, The Cole Memo: What Is It and What Does It Mean?, LEAFLY (Sep. 14,
2017), https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/what-is-the-cole-memo.
63. Id.
64. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. James Cole to All U.S. Attorneys
(Aug. 29, 2013) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
65. Wilson, supra note 61.
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and is rescinded, effective immediately.”66 Attorney General
Sessions’s action took place just three days after California’s
marijuana legalization law went into effect, creating even greater
uncertainty as to the future of the industry, “which [is] projected to
bring in $1 billion annually in tax revenue within several years.”67
Attorney General Sessions’s memo received backlash and
resistance from both marijuana advocates and politicians, including
conservatives.68 Senator Cory Gardner, a Republican from Colorado,
tweeted that the memo “has trampled on the will of voters.”69 Senator
Gardner also spoke before the Senate, expressing his willingness to
withhold DOJ nominees until Attorney General Sessions resolves this
policy dispute.70 In addition, Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno,
executive director of the Drug Policy Alliance, opined that Attorney
General Sessions wants to maintain a policy that has led to tremendous
injustices and wasted significant federal resources.71 Ms. SanchezMoreno was not shy in voicing her opinion, stating that “[i]f Sessions
thinks that makes sense in terms of prosecutorial priorities, he is in a
very bizarre ideological state, or a deeply problematic one.”72
Accordingly, Attorney General Sessions has signaled a likely federal
stance through his memo which effectively doubles down on his
personal opposition to marijuana.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF TENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to discussing how a threat to withhold federal funds from
California for legalizing marijuana might implicate Tenth Amendment
concerns, the Tenth Amendment’s trends in interpretation must first
be understood. This Part first outlines the development of the Supreme
Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence throughout various eras. It
then proceeds to explain and contextualize seminal cases in which the

66. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, supra note 61.
67. Sadie Gurman, Sessions Terminates US Policy that Let Legal Pot Flourish, AP NEWS (Jan.
4, 2018), https://apnews.com/19f6bfec15a74733b40eaf0ff9162bfa.
68. See id.
69. Jesse Paul, Cory Gardner Says AG Jeff Sessions’ Decision to Rescind Marijuana Policy
“Has Trampled on the Will” of Colorado Voters, DENV. POST (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/04/cory-gardner-jeff-sessions-marijuana-policy/.
70. Id.
71. Gurman, supra note 67.
72. Id.
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federal government attempted to influence state action through
threatening to withhold federal funding to states.
A. The Development of the Supreme Court’s Tenth
Amendment Jurisprudence
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”73 While seemingly
straightforward, the Supreme Court has, over time, announced various
conflicting interpretations of the Tenth Amendment’s power to impose
limitations on federal authority.74
In 1936, the Supreme Court decided Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,75
in which it ruled on the constitutionality of the federal Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act, which regulated prices, minimum wages,
maximum hours, and fair practices of the coal industry.76 In finding
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court in Carter reasoned that employing workers, mining coal, and
setting wages, hours, and working conditions, were found to be purely
part of the local process of production, separate from any regulation
under the Commerce Clause.77 Indeed, as Justice Sutherland
concluded, “[e]verything which moves in interstate commerce has had
a local origin. Without local production somewhere, interstate
commerce, as now carried on, would practically disappear.”78
Despite its Carter decision, the Supreme Court did not invalidate
a single federal statute for violating state sovereignty for close to forty
years. Thus, it appeared that the Tenth Amendment was futile as an
independent check upon federal power under the Commerce Clause.

73. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
74. See Gary Lawson & Robert Schapiro, Common Interpretation: The Tenth Amendment,
NAT’L CONST. CTR.: INTERACTIVE CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/amendments/amendment-x (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
75. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 303–04.
78. Id. at 304.
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1. The “Darby Era”
In 1941, the Supreme Court limited the Carter holding with its
decision in United States v. Darby.79 In Darby, Darby was charged
with violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) after he failed to
comply with wage and hour requirements for his employees that were
engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce.80 Darby
challenged the FLSA’s constitutionality, claiming its regulations did
not fall within the Commerce Clause.81 In a unanimous decision
written by Justice Stone, the Supreme Court upheld the direct ban on
interstate shipments, finding the FLSA “sufficiently definite to meet
constitutional demands.”82
The decision in Darby noted that the Tenth Amendment did not
interfere with the case, stating:83
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of
the relationship between the national and state governments
as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears
that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to
exercise fully their reserved powers.84
Accordingly, Darby solidified the Supreme Court’s position on
the freedom of Congress to impose any conditions it deemed necessary
upon activity which substantially affected interstate commerce.85
2. The “National League of Cities Era”
The Supreme Court breathed new life into the Tenth Amendment
in 1976, when it decided National League of Cities v. Usery.86 In
National League of Cities, the appellants, an association of cities,
challenged the constitutionality of Congress’s 1974 amendments to
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Id. at 110–11.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 118–19.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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the FLSA.87 Specifically, the National League of Cities argued that
Congress did not have the power to apply federal minimum-wage and
overtime rules to state and municipal employees.88 The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the FLSA’s amendments violated the Tenth
Amendment by intruding upon those powers left to the states.89
In the National League of Cities decision, the five-Justice
plurality held that while the amended minimum-wage and overtime
rules for state employees clearly affected commerce, they also violated
an independent requirement of the Tenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.90 As Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court previously
found that “[t]he Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs
the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system.”91 The fifth vote of the plurality in National League of Cities
came from Justice Blackmun, who wrote in his concurrence that he
was “not untroubled by certain possible implications of the Court’s
opinion.”92
3. The “Garcia Era”
In 1985, the Supreme Court again addressed the Tenth
Amendment as a limit on Congress’s power in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.93 In Garcia, Justice Blackmun now
joined the four dissenting justices from National League of Cities to
unconditionally overrule the Court’s 1976 holding.94
There, an employee brought suit against his employer, the San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, arguing that it was bound by
the FLSA because its function as a transit authority was not a
traditional function of state government.95 The issue in the case was
whether or not the overtime and minimum-wage provisions of the
FLSA were applicable to employees of municipally-owned and

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 836–37.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 839–40.
See id. at 842–43 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
Id. at 843 (quoting Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7).
Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See id.
See id. at 530.
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operated mass-transit systems.96 Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing traditional
and non-traditional governmental functions, stating, “The
constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating
traffic, for example, or between operating a highway authority and
operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best.”97
Justice Blackmun went on to discuss another problem with
National League of Cities, that of judicial subjectivity.98 His opinion
states, “Any rule of state immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’
‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental functions inevitably
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.”99 Yet, the majority
stressed that its rejection of National League of Cities did not dispose
of the limitations upon the federal government using its powers to
hinder the independence of the states.100 Instead, the Court held that
states were protected by “procedural safeguards” inherent in the
federal system.101
The Garcia dissenters understandably disagreed, believing that
the majority defeated the significance of the Tenth Amendment.102 In
his dissent, Justice Powell stated that the majority’s decision
“effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”103 It would be
several years before other cases began to chip away at Garcia’s broad
holding.
4. South Dakota v. Dole
With its decision in South Dakota v. Dole104 in 1987, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutional limitations on Congress’s power
to withhold funding to states in an effort to encourage their compliance
with federal law.105 In Dole, the state of South Dakota challenged a
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 538–39.
Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 551–52.
Id. at 552.
See id. at 528–29.
Id. at 560.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See id.
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federal law that reduced the provision of federal highway funds to
states that had a minimum drinking age below twenty-one as
unconstitutional.106 A majority of the Dole Court disagreed with South
Dakota and upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute, stating,
“Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the States to
enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise
choose. But the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the
States not merely in theory but in fact.”107
In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that the statute
did not apply unavoidable pressure because states which establish a
minimum drinking age lower than twenty-one would lose only a
relatively small percentage of federal highway funding.108 While
South Dakota argued that “the coercive nature of this program is
evident from the degree of success it has achieved,” the Dole Court
made clear that it could not hold a conditional grant of federal money
unconstitutional “simply by reason of its success in achieving the
congressional objective.”109 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist indicated
that the statute enforced by Congress “is directly related to one of the
main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate
travel.”110
The Supreme Court in Dole recognized that the federal
government’s spending power is not unlimited, “but is instead subject
to several general restrictions articulated in our cases.”111 The Court
ultimately prescribed a four-factor test for evaluating similar federal
expenditure cuts, which represented limitations on Congress’s
spending power:
The first of these limitations is derived from the language of
the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power
must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.” In considering
whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general
public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress. Second, we have required that if
Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of federal
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 205.
Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
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funds, it “must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation.” Third, our cases have
suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions
on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated
“to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs”’ Finally, we have noted that other constitutional
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional
grant of federal funds.112
Accordingly, while the Supreme Court in Dole reiterated the
power of Congress to control its spending, it also placed substantive
limitations on this power which acknowledged the states’ relative
autonomy.
5. The “New York v. United States Era” (Present-Day Supreme
Court Jurisprudence)
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided New York v. United States,113
which concerned the constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Amendments Act of 1985 (LRWAA).114 That statute attempted
to make each individual state arrange for the disposal of radioactive
waste generated within its borders.115 One provision of the LRWAA,
the “take title” incentive, required states that did not arrange for the
disposal of their waste to “take title” to that waste and be liable for
damages in connection with its disposal.116 The state of New York
objected and brought suit against the federal government, claiming
that the LRWAA violated the Tenth Amendment by forcing it to
regulate in a particular area.117
In New York v. United States, the majority of the Supreme Court
agreed with the State’s position, and held that the “take title” provision
did indeed violate the Tenth Amendment.118 Justice O’Connor
detailed this violation, stating that the “take title” provision was either
forcing states to regulate according to one federal instruction, or
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 207–08 (citations omitted).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 151–52.
Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 176–77.
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forcing them to submit to another federal instruction.119 Indeed, the
Court held that “[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”120 Thus, the Supreme Court
in New York v. United States affirmed that “Congress may not simply
‘commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.’”121
In 1997, the Supreme Court took its holding in New York v.
United States a step further and held that, in addition to being limited
in commandeering legislative processes, Congress also lacked the
power to compel a state’s executive branch to perform specific
functions.122 Printz v. United States123 concerned the Brady Act, a
1993 amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968.124 The Brady Act
required the Attorney General to establish a national background
check system aimed at controlling the flow of firearms.125 Until the
Attorney General computerized this national system, the Brady Act
required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks before issuing permits to buy firearms.126 Montana
Sheriff Jay Printz challenged this requirement’s constitutionality,
contending that the federal government did not have the authority to
mandate background checks on its behalf.127
A slim majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Sheriff Printz,
adhering to the Court’s decision in New York v. United States, and
added that Congress cannot bypass that decision by directly
conscripting the state’s officers.128 Justice Scalia delivered the
opinion, writing, “The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal

119. Id. at 176.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981)).
122. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 963 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel,
452 U.S. at 288).
123. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
124. Id. at 902.
125. Id. at 902–03.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 904.
128. Id. at 935.

(7) 52.3_GHARIBIAN (DO NOT DELETE)

12/2/2019 11:10 PM

2019] FEDERAL FUNDING & MARIJUANA-FRIENDLY STATES

293

regulatory program.”129 Justice Scalia went on to assert that it did not
matter whether policymaking was involved, because such commands
by the federal government were fundamentally unconstitutional.130
Thus, the majority’s opinion stood firm in its belief that “[i]t is an
essential attribute of the States’ retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority.”131
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,132 reaffirming the central holdings
in New York v. United States and Printz that the Tenth Amendment is
indeed an independent check on federal powers.133 In Sebelius, the
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), twenty-six
states, and other businesses and individuals (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
brought suit against the Department of Health and Human Services
and its Secretary, Kathleen Sebelius (collectively “Defendants”).134
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) enacted by Congress.135
Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged two provisions of the ACA: (1) the
individual mandate requiring American citizens to pay a penalty for
failing to purchase a health insurance policy of at least minimal
coverage; and (2) the Medicaid expansion provision requiring states
to greatly expand the number of covered individuals or risk losing their
existing federal funding.136
The Supreme Court concluded by a slim majority that “[t]he
Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a
financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be
characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it
is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”137
Still, the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts found
that while Congress had the power to levy and collect taxes, the ACA

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 928.
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 574.
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was unconstitutional with regard to the powers allotted to Congress
under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.138
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with Plaintiffs’ claim that the ACA’s
threat to withhold existing Medicaid funds to states served “no
purpose other than to force unwilling States to sign up for the dramatic
expansion in health care coverage effected by the Act.”139 Chief
Justice Roberts went on to clarify that while the Supreme Court in the
past had upheld the authority of Congress to condition the receipt of
funds on the states’ compliance with restrictions on the use of those
funds, this was based on a means by which Congress could ensure that
the funds were spent to promote the “general welfare.”140 The opinion
noted,
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds,
however, cannot be justified on that basis. When . . . such
conditions take the form of threats to terminate other
significant independent grants, the conditions are properly
viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy
changes.141
Chief Justice Roberts distinguished the case at hand from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dole.142 While the Dole Court concluded
that South Dakota was left with a “prerogative” to reject the policy
proposed by Congress, the states in Sebelius had no such power.143
Chief Justice Roberts described the threatened loss of over ten percent
of a state’s overall budget as “economic dragooning that leaves the
States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid
expansion.”144

138. Id. at 559–61 (“Although the [Necessary and Proper] Clause gives Congress authority to
‘legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,’ it does
not license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond those
specifically enumerated.”).
139. Id. at 580.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 581.
143. Id. at 581–82.
144. Id. at 582.
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B. Federal Government Efforts to Control State Action and the
Attempt to Influence States via the Threat of Withholding
Federal Funding
The federal government has also attempted to control state action
in areas other than marijuana legalization, from sports betting to
sanctuary cities, via federal statutes and threats to withhold funding
from states.
1. State-Sponsored Sports Betting and the Tenth Amendment
The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments addressing the
relevance of the Tenth Amendment in Christie v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n.145 In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).146 With the exception of a
few states, PASPA effectively banned sports betting across the
country.147 However, in 2011, New Jersey citizens overwhelmingly
approved a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports
gambling.148 After Governor Chris Christie signed a measure allowing
sports betting in New Jersey into law in 2012, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA), National Football League (NFL),
National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB)
filed suit against New Jersey, arguing that PASPA overruled state
law.149
The Supreme Court sought to address “[whether] a federal statute
that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on
private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of
states in contravention of New York v. United States.”150 The Supreme
Court heard oral arguments for the case on December 4, 2017,151
where several Justices expressed opinions seemingly favoring New

145. 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (mem.).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000).
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702–04 (2000).
148. David Sheldon, How SCOTUS Caught New Jersey’s Hail Mary on PASPA in 2017 to
Change US Sports Betting, CASINO.ORG (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.casino.org/news/scotusheard-new-jersey-on-paspa-in-2017-to-change-sports-betting.
149. Id.
150. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1488–89 (2018) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
151. Transcript of Oral Argument, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 824
(2017) (mem.) (No. 16-476).
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Jersey’s position.152 Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court’s notable
swing vote, stated that PASPA “leaves in place a state law that the
state does not want, so the citizens of the State of New Jersey are
bound to obey a law that the state doesn’t want but that the federal
government compels the state to have. That seems
commandeering.”153
Justice Breyer also expressed his concern with PASPA, stating
that the group of provisions addresses “what kind of law a state may
have, without a clear federal policy that distinguishes between what
they want states to do and what the federal government is doing.”154
He asserted, “That’s what this is about, telling states what to do, and
therefore, it falls within commandeering.”155
A ruling from the Supreme Court is pending at the time of this
Article’s publication.
2. The Withholding of Federal Funding from Sanctuary Cities
Even prior to taking office, President Trump threatened to
withhold federal funding from cities and counties that pursue their
status as sanctuary cities.156 In a speech on immigration given in
August 2016, President Trump claimed, “We will end the sanctuary
cities that have resulted in so many needless deaths. Cities that refuse
to cooperate with Federal authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars,
and we will work with Congress to pass legislation to protect those
jurisdictions that do assist Federal authorities.”157
On January 25, 2017, just five days after assuming office,
President Trump signed an executive order to start construction of a
152. The Legal Blitz, SCOTUS Oral Arguments Suggest that America’s Sports Betting Ban
Could
Soon
End,
ABOVE
THE
LAW
(Dec. 11, 2017,
12:59
PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/12/scotus-oral-arguments-suggest-that-americas-sports-bettingban-could-soon-end/?rf=1; Daniel Wallach, How the Supreme Court Could Hand a Win to New
Jersey
and
Sports
Betting,
FORBES
(Dec. 11, 2017,
7:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielwallach/2017/12/11/supreme-court-ncaa-christie-njbetting/#424587556ca7.
153. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 151, at 31.
154. Id. at 40.
155. Id.
156. Reema Khrais, Trump Promises to Block Funding to Sanctuary Cities, MARKETPLACE
(Nov. 14, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/11/14/elections/trump-promisesblock-funding-sanctuary-cities.
157. President Donald J. Trump Taking Action Against Illegal Immigration, WHITE HOUSE
(June 28, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/28/president-donald-jtrump-taking-action-against-illegal-immigration.
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wall on the Mexican border and to cut funding to municipal
governments acting as sanctuary cities for immigrants.158
Nevertheless, President Trump’s executive order received instant
backlash from leading human rights groups, activists, and even the
judiciary.159 Indeed, the Trump administration’s coercive ban received
strong resistance from federal courts that deemed the administration’s
threats as unconstitutional bullying.160
a. Northern District of California
In County of Santa Clara v. Trump,161 Santa Clara and San
Francisco filed motions to enjoin sections of President Trump’s
executive order, arguing that cutting federal funding to sanctuary cities
violated the United States Constitution.162 The Honorable William H.
Orrick of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California agreed with the counties and placed a nationwide hold on
President Trump’s executive order.163
Judge Orrick, a President Obama appointee based in San
Francisco, granted Santa Clara’s and San Francisco’s motions, holding
that President Trump’s order violated the United States
Constitution.164 Judge Orrick found that the counties demonstrated
that “losing all of their federal grant funding would have significant
effects on their ability to provide services to their residents and that
they may have no legitimate choice regarding whether to accept the
government’s conditions in exchange for those funds.”165 Judge
Orrick noted that President Trump’s executive order likely violated
the Tenth Amendment because it sought to coerce states and local
municipalities to enforce a federal regulatory program.166 Citing
Printz, New York v. United States, and Sebelius, Judge Orrick
158. David Smith, Trump Signs Order to Begin Mexico Border Wall in Immigration
Crackdown, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jan/25/donald-trump-sign-mexico-border-executive-order.
159. Id.
160. Maura Dolan & Joel Rubin, U.S. Judge Blocks Trump Order Threatening Funds for
‘Sanctuary’ Cities, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017, 6:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-sanctuary-trump-20170419-story.html.
161. 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
162. Id.
163. Dolan & Rubin, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 533.
166. Id.
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reiterated the Supreme Court’s repeated holding that the federal
government cannot compel, command, or coerce states to adopt
federal regulatory programs and policies.167 Applying these previous
holdings to the case at hand, Judge Orrick noted that “[t]he Executive
Order uses coercive means in an attempt to force states and local
jurisdictions to honor civil detainer requests, which are voluntary
‘requests’ precisely because the federal government cannot command
states to comply with them under the Tenth Amendment.”168 Judge
Orrick continued to hold that while the Trump administration has the
ability to incentivize states to voluntarily adopt federal programs, “it
cannot use means that are so coercive as to compel their compliance.
The Executive Order’s threat to pull all federal grants from
jurisdictions that refuse to honor detainer requests or to bring
‘enforcement action’ against them violates the Tenth Amendment’s
prohibitions against commandeering.”169
Thus, Judge Orrick’s straightforward application of the previous
Supreme Court holdings in Printz, New York v. United States, and
Sebelius clearly illustrated the constitutional issues surrounding the
federal government’s threats to withhold federal funding to sanctuary
cities by way of President Trump’s executive order.
b. Eastern District of Pennsylvania
In July of 2017, Attorney General Sessions repeatedly threatened
to withhold a $1.5 million federal grant from Philadelphia.170 The
grant in question was the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance
Grant, which Philadelphia has received every year since the grant’s
inception in 2005.171
Attorney General Sessions announced new requirements that
Philadelphia had to satisfy in order to continue receiving the grant,
including “that all jurisdictions must communicate with federal
agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; grant U.S.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 534.
169. Id.
170. Claire Sasko, Judge: Philly “Is Not a ‘Sanctuary City’”, PHILADELPHIA (Nov. 15, 2017,
2:31 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/11/15/sessions-sanctuary-city-ruling/.
171. Claire Sasko, Here Is the Lawsuit that Philly Just Filed Against Jeff Sessions, PHILA.
(Aug. 30, 2017, 10:46 AM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/08/30/philly-sues-jeffsessions/.
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to inmates of
interest in Philly’s prison system; and provide ICE with 48-hoursnotice of the scheduled release of a prisoner of interest.”172 In
response, Philadelphia filed a lawsuit against Attorney General
Sessions, claiming that the conditions he added were contrary to law
and unconstitutional.173
On November 15, 2017, the Honorable Michael Baylson of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
ruled that “Department of Justice (DOJ) law enforcement grants can’t
be withheld from Philadelphia because it refuses full cooperation with
federal authorities on immigration.”174 In issuing a preliminary
injunction to Philadelphia, Judge Baylson noted that the conditions set
forth by Attorney General Sessions did not satisfy the “demanding
threshold imposed by Dole.”175 Specifically, Judge Baylson stated that
Attorney General Sessions’s conditions violated the relatedness test
set forth in Dole, holding that “[t]he important question is whether the
conditions at issue related to the federal interest in the particular
program they are attached to.”176
Judge Baylson then held that even accepting a most generous
reading of the DOJ’s argument, the DOJ’s interest would be in
pursuing “criminal justice” broadly.177 Accordingly, the Court held
that “the fact that immigration enforcement depends on and is deeply
impacted by criminal law enforcement does not mean that the pursuit
of criminal justice in any way relies on the enforcement of
immigration law. Realistically, it does not.”178
Judge Baylson went on to note that Philadelphia clearly
established that it used the grant money “for purposes much broader
than the prosecution of criminals, and that adherence to the
Department of Justice conditions would conflict with its justifiable
policies towards non-criminal aliens.”179 Accordingly, in applying the
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Rafael Bernal, Judge Rules DOJ Can’t Withhold Money from Philadelphia over
‘Sanctuary City’ Policies, HILL (Nov. 15, 2017, 12:49 PM), http://thehill.com/latino/360500judge-rules-doj-cant-withhold-money-from-philadelphia-over-sanctuary-city-policies.
175. City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 644 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
176. Id. at 642.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 644.
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Dole test to the case at hand, Judge Baylson underscored the way in
which Attorney General Sessions’s repeated threats to withhold
federal funding to Philadelphia violated the Supreme Court precedent
established in Dole.180
IV. THREATS TO WITHHOLD FEDERAL FUNDING FROM LOCAL
JURISDICTIONS THAT LEGALIZE MARIJUANA IMPLICATE TENTH
AMENDMENT CONCERNS
While the Trump administration has not yet announced a specific
policy regarding marijuana legalization in California and other states,
legal scholars have suggested that any future policy may likely feature
a threat to withhold federal funding in an effort to compel these states
to abandon their legalization efforts.181 In response to being asked
whether California could challenge federal enforcement of marijuana
prohibition, Loyola Law School Professor Karl Manheim responded,
“[T]hat scenario isn’t likely. They can protest, but in response, the
federal government can threaten to withhold certain funding.”182
Sam Kamin, Vicente Sederberg Professor of Marijuana Law and
Policy at the University of Denver’s Sturm College of Law, also
commented on the uncertainty of how the spending power might be
tactically used against states that legalize marijuana by the Trump
administration.183 Referencing the Sebelius holding that Congress
could use its spending power as an inducement but not a threat,
Professor Kamin noted, “It’s not clear what the outer borders of [the
decision] are.”184 Still, Professor Kamin stated, “I don’t see why the

180. Id. at 649, 654.
181. Melina Delkic, How Jeff Sessions Plans to End Marijuana Before the Year Is Over,
NEWSWEEK MAG. (Nov. 24, 2017, 7:50 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/will-jeff-sessions-medical-marijuana-718676 (“‘He’s old fashioned
and very conservative,’ said Philip Heymann, a Harvard Law School professor and former Justice
Department official for the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton administrations. ‘Literally seven
years ago, maybe eight years ago, marijuana was thought to be a very dangerous drug. Why would
he focus on this issue? Because he’s seven years out of date.’”); Michael Roberts, Three Ways
Trump Could Shut down State-Legal Marijuana, WESTWORD (Dec. 1, 2016, 6:38 AM),
http://www.westword.com/news/three-ways-trump-could-shut-down-state-legal-marijuana8550568; Margolis, supra note 6.
182. Margolis, supra note 6.
183. Roberts, supra note 181.
184. Id.
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federal government might not try to say, ‘We’re going to withhold
some federal funds unless a state adopts or retains prohibition.’”185
Indeed, Attorney General Sessions’s recent memo rescinding the
Cole Memo suggested that the DOJ has no intention of maintaining
the status quo set forth by President Barack Obama’s administration
to refrain from interfering with state-level marijuana legalization
efforts.186 To the contrary, Attorney General Sessions made clear his
plans to “return to the rule of law.”187 To the extent that the federal
government were to pursue such a course of action, a court might very
well find a Tenth Amendment violation.
If the Trump administration follows through on a policy of
threatening to withhold funding similar to its threats to sanctuary
cities, this policy would likely fail under the standard set forth in Dole.
Indeed, any policy would have to involve spending that promotes the
“general welfare” while remaining noncoercive and constitutional in
nature.188 If the potential policy on marijuana mirrored Trump’s
executive order on the issue of sanctuary cities, federal courts across
the country would take issue with its strong-armed, threatening
position.
Moreover, because the Trump administration has not taken an
official position on withholding funding to states that legalize
marijuana, the specific grants which may be threatened remain
unclear. Scholars have indicated that grants to local law enforcement
agencies that fail to cooperate with federal anti-marijuana law
enforcement efforts may face cuts, as may grants allocated for federal
education spending on schools with drug use statistics above the
national average.189 Similar to the course of action the Trump
administration has already taken with regard to sanctuary cities, it
seems more likely that any federal fund withholding would come in
the form of cutting grants to state and local anti-crime agencies.

185. Id.
186. Read: Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s Memo Changing Marijuana Policy, HILL (Jan. 4,
2018, 1:28 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/367441-read-attorney-general-jeffsessionss-memo-changing-marijuana-policy?rnd=1515090571.
187. Id.
188. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08, 211 (1987).
189. Robert McVay, What Would Federal Marijuana Enforcement Look Like?, HARRIS
BRICKEN: CANNA L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.cannalawblog.com/what-would-federalmarijuana-enforcement-look-like/; Wallace, supra note 58.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW
To satisfy the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution,
the Trump administration should institute a policy which:
1. Specifically promotes the general welfare by reducing the sale
and consumption of marijuana across the nation, thereby
proportionally reducing marijuana-related offenses and violence;
2. Explicitly withholds anti-crime funding from law enforcement
agencies engaged in preventing drug related offenses. Moreover, this
policy should only withhold funding proportional to the total funding
received by law enforcement agencies in individual counties
throughout each state. Finally, the percentage of funds withheld
should remain below five percent of each county’s total funding for
anti-crime practices specifically geared towards regulating drugrelated crime and violence; and
3. Directly corresponds with the Controlled Substances Act and
relates to the federal government’s position on the illegality of
marijuana.
Accordingly, if the Trump administration proceeds to institute a
policy aimed at withholding federal funding from those states that
have and that wish to pursue the legalization of marijuana, the
administration will have to do so in a manner which complies with
Dole’s four-step framework. To do otherwise would present
constitutional concerns by ignoring the substantive limitations placed
by the Supreme Court on the federal government’s power to interfere
with states’ rights.190
VI. JUSTIFICATIONS: APPLYING THE DOLE TEST WILL ALLOW A
POTENTIAL FEDERAL POLICY OF WITHHOLDING FUNDING TO PASS
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
Reiterating the framework developed in Dole, the Trump
administration would need to present a policy which satisfies the
following requirements: (1) the policy must be in pursuit of the general
welfare; (2) if Congress wishes to apply conditions to states receiving
federal funds, it must do so unambiguously and enable the states to

190. Dole, 483 U.S. at 203.
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knowingly exercise their choice; (3) conditions on federal funds must
be related to the federal government’s interest in a particular national
project or program; and (4) other provisions of the United States
Constitution may act as independent bars to Congress’s wishes to
conditionally grant certain federal funds.191
A. Pursuing the General Welfare
The United States Constitution states that Congress may spend
money in aid of the general welfare.192 In determining whether
spending falls into the category of general welfare, the Supreme Court
has held, “[D]iscretion is at large. The discretion, however, is not
confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the
choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise
of judgment. This is now familiar law.”193 The Supreme Court in
Helvering v. Davis194 went on to note, “Nor is the concept of the
general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a century
ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the times.”195
As the Court in Dole noted:
Congress found that the differing drinking ages in the States
created particular incentives for young persons to combine
their desire to drink with their ability to drive, and that this
interstate problem required a national solution. The means it
chose to address this dangerous situation were reasonably
calculated to advance the general welfare.196
Thus, to pass constitutional muster, the Trump administration would
need to frame any withholding of federal funds as a means chosen to
advance the general welfare.
In reality, the consequences of withholding local law enforcement
funding could result in a substantial disservice to the general welfare
of states that pursue marijuana legalization. Withholding law
enforcement funding could significantly inhibit local law
enforcement’s ability to enforce not only drug related offenses, but
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
Id. at 641.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
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other crimes as well. Ironically, reducing law enforcement funding
would therefore create the risk of negatively impacting the general
welfare of states, irrespective of the Trump administration’s intentions
behind administering and enforcing such a policy.
However, per the proposed policy set forth above, the Trump
administration could reason that its aim was to reduce the substantial
presence and impact of marijuana at the state level. This would thus
promote the general welfare by reducing marijuana-related offenses
and violence, thereby supporting the overall well-being of the public
at large. Similar to Congress’s position in Dole that increasing the
drinking age would reduce the number of young individuals driving
inebriated, the Trump administration policy could aim to deter
marijuana-related crimes by reducing the availability of the drug
throughout the several states.197 With the power of discretion at its
side, the Trump administration would not likely face significant
challenges to this first restriction articulated in Dole.
B. Unambiguous Conditions and State Freedom to Exercise Choice
The Supreme Court in Dole held that the government can only
withhold federal funding via a federal policy that offers “mild
encouragement” and where the ultimate decision to abide “remains the
prerogative of the States.”198 The Sebelius Court distinguished its
holding from its earlier decision in Dole.199 In Sebelius, Chief Justice
Roberts noted that “[a] State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act’s
expansion in health care coverage thus stands to lose not merely ‘a
relatively small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all
of it.”200
Chief Justice Roberts went on to assert that “the financial
‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”201 Thus, Sebelius reaffirmed
in part the standard presented in Dole that in order to remain within
the bounds of the United States Constitution, Congress is not
permitted to withhold funding simply as a coercive measure to

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See id.
Id. at 211–12.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–82 (2012).
Id. at 581.
Id.
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intimidate the States to comply with the federal government’s
wishes.202
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,203 the
Supreme Court likened the federal government’s spending power to a
contract, stating that “in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions.”204 The Court expanded on
this idea, noting that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate
under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”205 Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that a state could not knowingly accept such a
“contract” if the state is unaware of the conditions being imposed on
it and is unable to ascertain federal expectations.206 Accordingly, the
Court concluded, “[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting
that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.”207
Just as the conditions in Dole, which “could not be more clearly
stated by Congress,” the proposed policy would need to
unambiguously set forth the specific terms by which federal funding
would be withheld from states.208 Moreover, the proposed percentage
of funds to be withheld represents a specific subsection of anti-crime
grants targeting the prevention of marijuana-based offenses and
violence. As the Sebelius Court pointed out in its analysis of Dole, the
five percent of highway funds that would be withheld from South
Dakota “constituted less than half of 1 percent of South Dakota’s
budget at the time.”209 Here, because the proposed policy’s five
percent cap only pertains to the narrower subsection of marijuana
prevention, the actual percentage of total state anti-crime funding
would be similarly unsubstantial.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 580.
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012).
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The Trump administration could therefore successfully employ
the proposed policy because it is far less coercive than the policy
which the federal government attempted to institute with regard to
sanctuary cities. Rather than attempting to withhold large amounts of
grant funding from states, the proposed policy reflects a noncoercive
nudge against California and other states attempting to pursue
marijuana legalization. Accordingly, the proposed policy would likely
satisfy the second step of the Dole standard requiring unambiguous
conditions and state freedom to exercise choice.
C. The Trump Administration’s Interest in Marijuana Legalization
The third restriction set forth by the Supreme Court in Dole
requires conditions on federal funds to be related “to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs.”210
Indeed, almost thirty years prior to Dole, the Supreme Court ruled
that “the Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable
conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all
objectives thereof.”211
In Dole, South Dakota did not seriously challenge the notion that
the federal government’s withholding of funds was unrelated to a
national interest.212 To the contrary, the condition imposed by
Congress was “directly related to one of the main purposes for which
highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel.”213
The memo released by the DOJ on January 4, 2018, begins to
present Attorney General Sessions’s position on the federal
government’s national interest in state-level marijuana legalization.
The memo reads:
In the Controlled Substances Act, Congress has generally
prohibited the cultivation, distribution, and possession of
marijuana. It has established significant penalties for these
crimes. These activities also may serve as the basis for the
prosecution of other crimes, such as those prohibited by the
210. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (citing Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)) (noting that the Supreme Court’s previous cases did not provide
significant elaboration as to determining federal interest in national programs).
211. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958), overruled on other
grounds by California v. United States, 438 U.S. 64 (1978).
212. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
213. Id.
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money laundering statutes, the unlicensed money transmitter
statute, and the Bank Secrecy Act. These statutes reflect
Congress’s determination that marijuana is a dangerous drug
and that marijuana activity is a serious crime.214
The proposed policy calls for a narrower approach to withholding
funds—only targeting marijuana-related anti-crime funding—than
that which the Trump administration attempted with sanctuary cities.
In addition, Attorney General Sessions’s policy is directly related to
the federal government’s position that marijuana should not be
legalized pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.215 The Trump
administration has repeatedly expressed the federal interest in keeping
the cultivation, sale, and possession of marijuana illegal.216 In addition
to significant penalties for the crimes associated with growing and
selling marijuana, Attorney General Sessions has further claimed that
its dangers create additional crimes in the areas of money laundering
and fraud.217 Thus, the proposed policy merely reflects the Controlled
Substances Act and the federal government’s interest in preventing the
various crimes that arise with the increased presence of marijuana
across the country. Accordingly, such a policy would presumably
satisfy the national interest requirement set forth in Dole.
D. Other Potential Constitutional Bars
The final restriction presented in Dole asserts that “other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds.”218 In interpreting the independent
constitutional bar, the Dole Court held that this limitation was not “a
prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress
is not empowered to achieve directly.”219 Instead, Chief Justice
Rehnquist held that the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions stood for
“the unexceptional proposition that the power may not be used to
214. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, supra note 61 (citations
omitted).
215. Id.
216. Id.; Lopez, supra note 3; Robinson, supra note 36; Rough, supra note 62.
217. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, supra note 61 (asserting
that growing and selling marijuana may also “serve as the basis for the prosecution of other crimes,
such as those prohibited by the money laundering statutes, the unlicensed money transmitter statute,
and the Bank Secrecy Act”).
218. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
219. Id. at 210.
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induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional.”220
The Dole Court then provided examples of what may constitute
such inducement, stating that “a grant of federal funds conditioned on
invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress’
broad spending power.”221 Accordingly, the Court concluded that even
if South Dakota were to “succumb to the blandishments offered by
Congress and raise its drinking age to 21, the State’s action in so doing
would not violate the constitutional rights of anyone.”222
Thus, should the proposed Trump administration policy of
withholding federal funds from states that legalize marijuana satisfy
the first three restrictions announced in Dole, the Tenth Amendment
will not interfere as an independent constitutional bar.
VII. CONCLUSION
If the Trump administration pursues a policy threatening to
withhold funding from California and the other states that seek to
legalize marijuana, it must present a federal policy consistent with the
Supreme Court’s framework set forth in Dole. If the federal
government instead attempts to impose such a threat with the intent to
simply coerce and punish noncompliant states, such a threat would
constitute a violation of the powers otherwise reserved to the States
under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

220. Id.
221. Id. at 210–11.
222. Id. at 211.

